U.S. v. Live Nation proposed settlement - NIVA Tunney Act comments Letter
September 4, 2026
David Teslicko, Acting Chief
Financial Services, Fintech, and Banking Section
Antitrust Division
Department of Justice
450 Fifth Street NW, Suite 4000
Washington, DC 20530
Submitted via email: LiveNationPublicComment@usdoj.gov
Re: United States v. Live Nation Entertainment, Inc., No. 1:24-cv-3973-AS (S.D.N.Y.)
Comments of the National Independent Venue Association
Dear Mr. Teslicko:
The National Independent Venue Association (NIVA) represents independent venues, promoters, festivals, and presenters across all 50 states and the District of Columbia. Our members are the small businesses and nonprofits that develop artists, bring live entertainment to communities of every size, and provide the competition that a healthy live entertainment market requires. They also know firsthand how decisions about tour promotion, venue routing, ticketing, and artist representation affect whether an independent venue owner, operators, or promoters ever has a meaningful opportunity to compete for a show.
On April 15, a jury in the Southern District of New York found Live Nation liable as an illegal monopoly.¹ The jury’s verdict creates an historic opportunity to restore competition to a market in which Live Nation’s power has been allowed to encroach across multiple parts of the live entertainment ecosystem for decades. But restoring competition will require more than a consent decree. Previous consent decrees did not prevent the conduct that ultimately led a jury to find Live Nation and Ticketmaster liable for monopolization and unlawful tying.² The necessary remedies must therefore address the structure and sources of leverage that allow Live Nation to use power in one part of the industry to reinforce its position in another.
The addition of the remedies discussed below are necessary for the proposed consent to serve the public interest and reflect the experience of independent venues, promoters, festivals, and presenters that compete in this market every day. These reforms would restore competition and put more power back in the hands of independent businesses, artists, and fans nationwide. Without the proposed remedies, the proposed consent judgment is not in the public interest and should be rejected.
The Remedies That Would Actually Rein in Live Nation’s Illegal Monopoly
Meaningful Remedy #1: Prohibit Live Nation-controlled Entities from Promoting More Than 50% of an Artist’s Domestic Tour Dates
Live Nation should be prohibited from promoting more than 50% of the domestic dates on any headline artist’s tour in a calendar year. Control of an entire tour gives Live Nation leverage far beyond individual shows. A venue that depends on Live Nation-controlled tours for programming may face pressure to accept Live Nation’s ticketing or other commercial terms because saying no can put an entire pipeline of concerts at risk. Independent promoters may never get the opportunity to compete for those shows in the first place. The trial evidence showed how control of tours can be used to influence which venues get shows and which ticketing companies they use.³
The extent of that leverage can be measured. A review of the top 200 U.S. tours from 2018 to 2025 counted how many tours were either promoted exclusively by Live Nation or more than half of their shows booked by it. In every season evaluated over the past three years, those tours were the overwhelming majority of the top 200 – between 69 percent and 74 percent over the last three years.⁴ The entity that books a tour determines the price for the shows on it. A tour cap remedy would increase competition for tours and give more promoters and artists the power to set prices. Without a tour cap, even if the company were broken up into two or three companies, Live Nation would still set ticket prices and fees for most shows in the United States due to their control of the tours.
The Live Nation Blockade. An example of what an exclusive Live Nation tour can look like when Live Nation funnels a tour date or multiple tour dates and accompanying features exclusively through the Live Nation ecosystem.
The proposed consent judgment itself confirms that a 50% tour cap is appropriate, as there is an agreed upon 50% threshold related to ticketing in the agreement. Live Nation agreed to allow promoters and artists to sell up to half of the tickets at its amphitheaters via competing marketplaces.⁵ The settlement terms also treat booking fewer than half of the shows at a venue as not amounting to control of the venue.⁶ In a document Live Nation negotiated and signed,⁷ it agreed that half the tickets at its own amphitheaters is the line at which they should be available to be sold through competing marketplaces, and that booking less than half of a venue’s does not constitute control of a show. Live Nation drew the 50% line itself for ticketing. If 50% is an appropriate threshold for a building’s ticket inventory, 50% is likewise an appropriate cap for each artist’s tour.
A 50% cap would eliminate Live Nation’s significant leverage over ticketing dictated by their control of tours about which there was trial testimony from witnesses for the Barclays Center, the Minnesota Wild, SeatGeek, AXS, and more. This cap would open a meaningful share of every tour to competition. Independent national, corporate, and regional promoters could bid for dates based on their knowledge of the market, relationships with local fans, and the economics they can offer the artist. Artists could compare those offers and choose the promoter and venue that make sense for each market. Live Nation could still compete aggressively for major tours, but it would have to win individual dates rather than control the entirety or the majority of the tour itself.
Consider an artist who built their early career in a smaller city and developed a loyal following at a local independent venue. The local promoter knows the audience and knows that bringing the artist back can sell out the room. When one national promoter controls the tour, that community may be skipped in favor of a larger market and a venue within the promoter’s network. Fans are left traveling hours and spending more to see the same artist. Under a 50% cap, the local promoter gets a chance to compete for that date, and the artist can choose to return without jeopardizing the rest of the tour. More markets become viable stops. Fans get more shows closer to home. Artists can keep building audiences in the communities that supported them, and the independent promoters that develop those relationships get the programming they need to stay in business. The result is a touring market built to sustain artists, venues, and fan demand over time - not fuel the illegal Live Nation monopoly.
Meaningful Remedy #2: Require Live Nation to Divest from Ticketmaster
Live Nation should be required to sell Ticketmaster so ticketing and concert promotion can operate as independent businesses that compete on their own merits. The merger placed the dominant ticketing platform inside the same company that promotes tours and owns and operates venues. That structure allows Live Nation to use power in one part of the industry to protect its position in another. At trial, the former head of Barclays Center testified that after the venue decided to leave Ticketmaster, Live Nation threatened its broader concert relationship, and the building’s Live Nation shows fell from 23 in 2019 to 14 in 2022.⁸ The rest of the trial record told the same story: witnesses testified about an arena that left a million dollars a year on the table rather than risk losing concerts by switching ticketers,⁹ a rival ticketing company that wrote “retaliation insurance” into its contracts to reassure venues afraid of losing shows,¹⁰ and venues that turned down better offers for exactly these reasons.¹¹ A venue should be able to choose the ticketing company that offers the best deal for its artists and fans without risking access to concerts.
Live Nation currently competes for concerts with the advantage of controlling the dominant ticketing platform, one of the largest advertising platforms in live entertainment,¹² and the control of dozens of artist management companies reinforcing its position.¹³ Divestiture addresses the structure that makes this leverage possible. Ticketmaster would then have to win venue contracts based on its fees, technology, and ability to serve fans.
Divestiture would begin to change that dynamic. Ticketmaster would have to compete for artists and venues on price, service, technology, and the experience it provides their fans. Artists and venues would gain the power to reject Live Nation-Ticketmaster on behalf of their fans because another ticketing company could realistically win their business.
Any divestiture must create truly independent businesses and prevent Live Nation from rebuilding the same market power through new contractual relationships or future acquisitions. Live Nation should be prohibited from recreating its relationships with divested companies through exclusive agreements, revenue sharing, data sharing, or other commercial arrangements. Future acquisitions should also require prior legal approval. Otherwise, the structure the Court dismantles today could slowly be rebuilt tomorrow.
A Live Nation-owned or exclusively booked venue should not continue using a divested Ticketmaster through a new long-term agreement. A divested artist management company must be free to send its artists to competing promoters and venues. Independent companies need a genuine opportunity to win that business. The same principle applies to future acquisitions. Live Nation should not be able to buy the venues, promoters, or other competitors that emerge and rebuild the concentration these remedies are intended to address.
Meaningful Remedy #3: Require Live Nation to Divest from Artist Management Businesses
Live Nation should be required to divest its artist management businesses. An artist’s manager should answer to the artist and make decisions based on what will build the strongest, longest career possible. That independence is compromised when the manager works for the same corporation that can promote the tour, operate the venue, and sell the tickets. The artist becomes both a client and a source of business for other Live Nation divisions. As the May 2026 Rolling Stone piece from NIVA’s Executive Director explains, this structure can leave independent competitors without a fair opportunity and raise questions about whose interests the artist’s team is ultimately representing.¹⁴
An artist should be able to trust that their manager recommends a promoter, venue, or tour strategy because it is the right choice for their career and their fans. Live Nation’s ownership of management creates a competing corporate interest because the company advising the artist can also profit from where that advice leads.
Divestiture would remove that conflict. An independent manager could compare competing offers, choose a smaller venue when it better fits the artist, push for more accessible ticket prices, or return to a market where a loyal fan base is growing. Live Nation could still compete for that business, but it would have to convince the artist’s independent team that its offer is the best one.
That freedom matters over the course of an artist’s career. A manager can build a touring strategy that develops audiences market by market and allows an artist to return to those fans year after year. The goal should be a career that can sustain decades of live performance, not a tour built around one corporation’s assets. Fans benefit from artists who can tour sustainably, remain connected to the communities that built them, and keep coming back.
Meaningful Remedy #4: Independent Stages Must be Made Financially Whole
Alongside fans, independent venues, festivals, promoters, and presenters have been threatened, undermined, and marginalized by Live Nation’s unchecked market power. In 2025, 64 percent of independent stages across the United States were not profitable.¹⁵ Meanwhile, Live Nation made $25.3 billion in revenue in 2025.¹⁶ Live Nation has started or acquired venues that snuff out independent competition in communities,¹⁷ bought entire tours before independent venues and promoters even have a chance to bid, and driven up the cost of shows for the entire ecosystem due to their ability to take losses on shows by supplementing their low-margin concert business with multi-billion-dollar ticketing and sponsorship business lines.¹⁸ Independent venues cannot survive sustained losses driven by Live Nation’s dominance of the market and diversion of entertainment to its venues, and have suffered as a result.
Therefore, in addition to amounts reserved for the fans severely impacted by Live Nation monopolistic conduct, a significant portion of the, hopefully, record financial penalty levied against Live Nation should be reserved by the state attorneys general for Music and Live Performance funds established by states to ensure the survival of independent stages that Live Nation’s anti-competitive practices have harmed.
The Proposed Settlement’s Failures
Under federal law, the court must determine whether the settlement is in the public interest before it can take effect, and the public is given the opportunity to comment first.¹⁹ NIVA has examined the settlement as a whole. The section that follows explains what each main part of the settlement offers and then compares these provisions with the meaningful remedies outlined above.
The settlement imposes no limit on tour control, no divestiture of Ticketmaster, no divestiture of artist management, and nothing approaching the structural and behavioral change needed to rein in a monopoly. The sections below show how the settlement’s definitions and exceptions reduce even its relatively modest commitments when compared with the facts of the case, the original complaint, and the Court’s summary judgment Order issued before trial. Yet the first problem outweighs any of the issues with the individual provisions: the settlement gives an inaccurate account of what Live Nation’s illegal monopoly entails.
The settlement ignores the reality of what has happened since Live Nation announced its settlement with the U.S. Department of Justice in March.²⁰ On April 15, a jury found Live Nation liable on every count brought by the 34 state attorneys general that continued the case.²¹ The case put three claims before that jury: monopolization of primary ticketing, monopolization of large amphitheaters and major concert venues, and the unlawful tying of amphitheater access to Live Nation’s promotion services.²² The jury’s verdict was limited to conduct at venues of a particular size only in the context of amphitheaters. The complaint discussed major concert venues and large amphitheaters in the amphitheater claim, where Live Nation was charged with tying access to its amphitheaters to the purchase of its promotion services.²³ However, the ticketing monopolization claim had no capacity limit. The complaint alleged a monopoly over all primary ticketing, alleging the conduct impacts clubs, theaters, ballrooms, and festivals as much as arenas.²⁴ The court’s summary judgment ruling narrowed other claims and left the ticketing claim intact, as alleged.²⁵ That is the claim the jury decided, and the verdict reflects it: Live Nation monopolized ticketing at venues of every size, and it illegally tied amphitheater access to its promotion services.²⁶
Settlement Failure #1: The Proposed Settlement Dramatically Narrows Its Reach to the Fewest Venues
The settlement rewrites the scope of Live Nation’s illegal monopolization. Nearly every obligation in it is keyed to “Major Concert Venue,” which the settlement defines as arenas and amphitheaters with 8,000 or more seats that host at least ten covered events a year.²⁷ That definition applies broadly to every monopolization claim in the settlement, not anywhere else. The government’s own explanation of the deal concedes as much: when the Competitive Impact Statement uses the term, its footnote defines it by citing the settlement itself, not the complaint.²⁸ The same document then retells the story of the case in the settlement’s vocabulary, describing the adjudicated conduct as “exclusive primary ticketing contracts with Major Concert Venues,” as though the ticketing case had always been about big buildings.²⁹ It had not. The settlement takes the capacity idea from one claim, the amphitheater claim, and artificially applies it across the remedy for every claim, including the universal ticketing monopoly the jury found.
The capacity boundary included in the proposed settlement is a product of the agreement, not of the case allegations or verdict. The ticketing monopoly that the jury identified had no capacity restriction.³⁰ Live Nation is rapidly expanding venue acquisition and construction at capacities below the 8,000 capacity threshold: entire tours that are directed through its House of Blues and Fillmore rooms, and will soon be directed through its 2,000-6,000 capacity rooms in Milwaukee, Pittsburgh, Nashville, Tampa, San Diego, Salt Lake City, and more communities across the country.³¹ The settlement does not include any of those buildings despite the ticketing monopolization verdict touching all those rooms. If approved by the Court, on the day the settlement is entered, Ticketmaster will still be able to enter into a ten-year exclusive contract with every club and theater in America, and Live Nation will still be able to take exclusive booking control of those same rooms; none of the settlement’s provisions will be triggered.³²
The enforcement section makes it clear that the two-tier system is intentional. The conduct rules protect all venues only in words, not in practice. A $5 million penalty applies only in cases involving “Major Concert Venues” (Section XVIII.E); there appears to be no penalty schedule for any other situation.³³ If Live Nation or Ticketmaster retaliates against an independent club, they breach this settlement with no penalty.
Settlement Failure #2: Festivals Are Written Entirely Out of Live Nation’s Monopoly, Even Though They Are a Key Pillar of It
The settlement’s obligations run to “Live Entertainment Events.” Section II.M defines that term to exclude any multi-day, multi-artist festival.³⁴
The provision applies to all the other definitions and excludes festivals from the entire settlement. ‘Retaliation’ is defined as withholding or degrading Live Entertainment Events (Section II.Z).³⁵ It therefore does not count as retaliation, no matter how severe, to withhold a festival slot, to redirect a festival away from a market, or to schedule a competing festival against a venue which has chosen a rival ticketer. A festival site that hosts nothing but festivals has zero covered events and can thus never be a covered venue under the proposed document.³⁶ A company that produces only festivals is not considered a ‘Promoter’ according to the settlement’s definitions
(Section II.X),³⁷ which means that Live Nation may acquire festival companies of any size without having to give the acquisition notice which is otherwise required by the settlement (Section XIV.A).³⁸ The settlement makes no mention of radius clauses, even though the complaint’s allegations concerning radius relate to festival-based restrictions that keep artists off independent stages for months around the festival date.³⁹ By excluding festivals from each and every defined term, the settlement effectively rules out any interpretive reading of its conduct rules that could have included them.
One of Live Nation’s main tools is its festival portfolio; it secures top musical acts, brings venues in surrounding areas under control, and establishes the radius restrictions against which independent venues and festivals must compete each season. The settlement preserved this tool for Live Nation by writing it out of the remedies imposed by the agreement.
Settlement Failure #3: Ticketmaster Builds, Operates, and Prices the Ticketing “Remedy”
Under the proposed settlement, Ticketmaster must allow the covered venues to sell tickets on rival marketplaces within 275 days, and Ticketmaster will remain responsible for all functions of its back-end software (Section IV.A).⁴⁰
It is an access remedy in which the monopolist is the point of access. Competitors do not obtain the infrastructure; instead, they are integrated into the infrastructure that the monopolist builds, maintains, and updates. The settlement includes no technical specifications, no API standard, no requirement as to uptime or speed, no obligation that the rivals’ integration should perform at least as well as Ticketmaster’s own marketplace, no acceptance tests, and no third-party certification.⁴¹ The 275-day deadline has no intermediate milestones and says nothing about penalties for failing to meet it, and each day the deadline is delayed means the monopolist retains its exclusivity revenues. Ticketmaster could be permitted charge fees to the rival marketplaces to cover its so-called “costs”, based on its own financial records.⁴² One should not expect competition to arrive on time when it relies on the illegal monopolist’s engineering, documentation, and pricing.
This could make Ticketmaster’s stranglehold on the market even greater by making competitors rely on its technology to sell tickets through this Live Nation-favored plan.
Settlement Failure #4: Many of the “Divestiture” Venues Are Evidenced to Already Do What the Proposed Settlement Requires
The only “structural relief” claimed by the settlement relates to thirteen named amphitheaters. Each of them can have their booking and control contracts with Live Nation terminated or altered “on terms agreeable to” Live Nation (Section V.A).⁴³ No building, lease, or equity is transferred. Furthermore, the settlement clearly maintains Live Nation’s right to continue booking and administering these venues’ calendars (Section XV).⁴⁴ There is no evidence of actual divestiture required by this settlement.
Six of the thirteen already operate the way the settlement outlines as a “remedy.” American Family Insurance Amphitheater, Bethel Woods Center for the Arts, Cynthia Woods Mitchell Pavilion, Ford Idaho Center, the Walmart AMP, and Maine Savings Amphitheater are owned or operated by municipalities, nonprofits, or other operators. They already allow promoters other than Live Nation to book shows or rent the building. Several publish rental guides and booking contacts on their own websites, and Maine Savings Amphitheater is already programmed by an independent promoter, Waterfront Concerts.⁴⁵ At these venues, the settlement’s centerpiece appear to just be the status quo.
Divestiture or Status Quo? Image of the Ford Idaho Center’s website indicating an open invitation for outside promoters to promote shows at one the Live Nation venues Live Nation claims to be “divesting” from if the proposed settlement is approved.
What is omitted from the list is more important: the main amphitheaters in the largest markets in the country, the venues that form the core of summer touring, are all being retained by Live Nation without disruption. A divestiture that transfers nothing, at venues that Live Nation has chosen, half of which already permit what it mandates, is not adequate relief. It is a contract renegotiation in which Live Nation could retain 99.9% control instead of 100% at a handful of venues it does not own and may not operate.⁴⁶
Settlement Failure #5: A Ticketing Right Live Nation Grants Mostly to Itself
At the amphitheaters that Live Nation owns, operates, or controls, the settlement gives promoters and artists the right to send up to 50 percent of the tickets for their shows via competing marketplaces (Section IV.J).⁴⁷
In theory, it appears as though the tickets are being made available to half the building. In reality, the right belongs to the promoter or to the artist who is performing, and at Live Nation’s amphitheaters the promoter is overwhelmingly Live Nation itself. The settlement hands its headline ticketing choice to the one party that will likely never exercise that right. Live Nation will not pass on tickets to its own ticketing company’s competitors.
That leaves outside-promoted shows at these buildings, which is a rare circumstance. Even there, the right works only if an independent promoter is able to gain access to the building in the first place, and that access runs through rental-parity clauses whose list of allowable justifications for charging outside promoters more literally concludes with “etc.” (Section V.C).⁴⁸ For artists, the choice generally runs through their managers, and in the case of the numerous artists managed by Live Nation’s own affiliates, that means Live Nation’s own side of the table.⁴⁹ A right which only the monopolist’s competitors need and which is drafted in such a way that only the monopolist can put it into practice is not a remedy; it is merely a talking point.
Settlement Failure #6: The Penalties Never Reach the Businesses Being Harmed
The settlement’s penalty is $5 million per violation involving a Major Concert Venue, payable to the U.S. Treasury (Section XVIII.E),⁵⁰ plus about $18.6 million in payments to the six settling states.⁵¹
Five million dollars is less than two hours of Live Nation’s roughly $25.2 billion in annual revenue.⁵² The settlement then shrinks even that. Multiple threats against the same venue in the same “contracting cycle,” a term the settlement never defines, count as a single violation.⁵³ A season-long coercion campaign against one venue counts as one violation. Below 8,000 seats, there is no penalty schedule at all for any violation. And none of the money reaches anyone who was harmed. Penalties go to the Treasury. The state payments compensate six state governments for releasing their claims. Not a dollar is committed to go to an injured venue, promoter, artist, or fan.
Settlement Failure #7: The Prior Notice of Future Live Nation Transactions Provisions are Inadequate
The proposed consent judgment requires Live Nation to give thirty days’ advance notice rather than obtaining approval when it acquires ticketing companies, promoters, or major concert venues as part of deals which are too small to attract the standard federal merger review (Section XIV.A).⁵⁴
The complaint states that the monopoly was created through a series of acquisitions, including promoters, venues, and festivals, many of which fall below the levels that would prompt federal scrutiny.⁵⁵ In response, the settlement introduces a notice rule containing four exemptions that correspond to the way Live Nation actually carries out its purchases.⁵⁶ No notice is needed when acquiring additional interests in companies in which Live Nation already has an interest, since this gradual acquisition of control via joint-ventures is the company’s typical method of acquisition. Similarly, no notice is needed for real estate and leases associated with new venue developments, as this forms Live Nation’s entire construction program. No notice is also required when exercising purchase obligations already included in existing contracts. No notice is required either for foreign companies that have U.S. revenues of less than $15 million. The scope of the rule is just as significant as the exemptions it contains: all festivals and, separately, venues 7,999 and below are not considered to be Major Concert Venues and therefore purchasing them involves no requirement to give notice. Also, festival producers are not classified as “Promoters” according to the definitions set out in the settlement, so acquisitions of festivals require no notice at all.⁵⁷
The definitions in fact lead Live Nation towards even greater control rather than less. The agreement prohibits preferred booking arrangements at major venues but omits operating leases from the definition (Section II.S).⁵⁸ Since it can no longer exert preferential influence over a venue, Live Nation can take over the building by means of a lease and thus get out of the prohibition. If the lease is connected to a development project, it is also exempt from the requirement to give acquisition notice.⁵⁹ There is also a separate exception which allows Live Nation to take up to 49% of a venue’s annual events via a side agreement with the venue’s own promoter.⁶⁰ By drafting the settlement to exclude exclusive contracts, the settlement directs the monopolist towards the two areas that remain unregulated: ownership and near-half control. Over eight years,⁶¹ with no oversight with respect to venues below 8,000 seats and without supervision over festivals, their monopoly could be strengthened and expanded downward into the venue and promotions market 7,999 capacity and below.
Settlement Failure #8: Artist Data the Artist Cannot Use
The settlement states that Live Nation must provide an artist with information about those who have bought tickets to that artist’s own shows, on the condition that privacy limits and a non-disclosure agreement are observed (Section IX).⁶²
The specific counteract what the headline suggests. The data is provided only upon request and not automatically. The NDA prevents the artist from sharing it with Live Nation’s competitors or with data aggregators; this restriction applies to the analytics and marketing tools that an artist would be anticipated to use in order to act on the data, and it blocks the one situation that would lead to competition: bringing the artist’s audience over to a different promoter or ticket seller.⁶³ The settlement treats the artist’s fan data as competitively sensitive information “belonging to” Live Nation.⁶⁴ The privacy limits are determined by Ticketmaster’s own promises to ticket buyers, as set out in the terms that Ticketmaster drafted, and the settlement merely prohibits Ticketmaster from making those terms worse.⁶⁵ The main restrictions, “for such Artist’s sole interests”, “standard privacy protection”, and limitations no greater than “necessary”, are all undefined and are contained in documents that the artist never gets to negotiate.⁶⁶ Notice of the right is sent to the artist’s manager, and since many artists are managed by Live Nation’s own affiliates, this means that notice of the rights against Live Nation is sent to Live Nation’s side of the table.⁶⁷ The government states that this clause is included so artists can build their fan bases regardless of which promoters or ticketers they work with in the future. The NDA prohibits exactly that.
In summary, the proposed the proposed consent judgment will not rein in Live Nation’s illegal monopoly, is not in the public interest, and should be rejected.
NIVA is grateful for the opportunity to participate in the Tunney Act process.
Sincerely,
Stephen Parker
Executive Director National Independent Venue Association
¹ Jury verdict, United States, et al. v. Live Nation Entertainment, Inc., No. 1:24-cv-3973-AS (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2026) (finding Defendants liable on all counts). ² United States v. Ticketmaster Entertainment, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-00139 (D.D.C.), Final Judgment (July 30, 2010), ECF No. 15; Amended Final Judgment (Jan. 28, 2020), ECF No. 29; see Competitive Impact Statement § II.A (recounting that, in the view of the United States, Live Nation repeatedly violated the 2010 decree, producing the 2020 amendment, and that the conduct continued). ³ Trial testimony of John Abbamondi, former CEO, BSE Global (Barclays Center), United States, et al. v. Live Nation Entertainment, Inc., No. 1:24-cv-3973-AS (S.D.N.Y. 2026). ⁴ Review of the top 200 U.S. tours by season in Pollstar Magazine, 2019 through 2025, compiled from Pollstar touring data; the review flagged those tours that were promoted exclusively by Live Nation or with the majority of dates promoted by Live Nation. ⁵ Proposed Final Judgment § IV.J. ⁶ Proposed Final Judgment § II.S(3) (excluding from “Preferred Booking Agreement” arrangements under which Live Nation promotes less than 50% of a venue’s events in a calendar year). ⁷ Proposed Final Judgment, recitals (Defendants consent to entry); Term Sheet, ECF No. 1171-1 (executed Mar. 5, 2026). ⁸ Trial testimony of John Abbamondi, former CEO, BSE Global (Barclays Center), United States, et al. v. Live Nation Entertainment, Inc., No. 1:24-cv-3973-AS (S.D.N.Y. 2026). ⁹ Trial testimony of Mitch Helgerson, Chief Revenue Officer, Minnesota Wild, United States, et al. v. Live Nation Entertainment, Inc., No. 1:24-cv-3973-AS (S.D.N.Y. 2026).¹⁰ Trial testimony of Jack Groetzinger, CEO, SeatGeek, United States, et al. v. Live Nation Entertainment, Inc., No. 1:24-cv-3973-AS (S.D.N.Y. 2026).¹¹ Trial testimony of Bryan Perez, CEO, AXS, United States, et al. v. Live Nation Entertainment, Inc., No. 1:24-cv-3973-AS (S.D.N.Y. 2026). 12 Live Nation Entertainment annual reports (sponsorship and advertising segment). ¹² Live Nation Entertainment annual reports (sponsorship and advertising segment).¹³ Amended Complaint (alleging Live Nation’s ownership and control of artist management companies); see also Live Nation management holdings from SEC Exhibit 21 subsidiary filings, FY2005–FY2025. ¹⁴ Op-ed by NIVA’s executive director on the Live Nation verdict, Rolling Stone (2026), rollingstone.com/music/music-news/live-nation-verdict-niva-head-op-ed-1235556485. ¹⁵ National Independent Venue Association, State of Live National Report (2025). ¹⁶ Live Nation Entertainment, Inc., Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2025 Results (reporting $25.3 billion in 2025 revenue). At that rate, $5 million is approximately 1.7 hours of global revenue. ¹⁷ Live Nation venue development announcements (Venue Nation), 2024–2026, including new clubs and theaters announced for Milwaukee, Pittsburgh, Nashville, Tampa, San Diego, and Salt Lake City. ¹⁸ Amended Complaint (venue and promoter acquisitions; loss-taking on concerts subsidized by ticketing and sponsorship revenue); Competitive Impact Statement § II.B (Live Nation acquired and leased amphitheaters even where it projected financial losses). ¹⁹ 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)–(h), (e)(1) (Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act). ²⁰ Proposed Final Judgment, recitals (Defendants consent to entry); Term Sheet, ECF No. 1171-1 (executed Mar. 5, 2026). ²¹ Amended Complaint, caption; Proposed Final Judgment, recitals (identifying Arkansas, Iowa, Mississippi, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and South Dakota as the Settling States); Proposed Final Judgment § XXI (claims of non-settling State Plaintiffs unaffected). ²² Jury verdict, United States, et al. v. Live Nation Entertainment, Inc., No. 1:24-cv-3973-AS (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2026). The counts tried were the primary ticketing monopolization claims, which carried no venue-capacity boundary, and the amphitheater monopolization and tying claims. The verdict therefore establishes monopolization of ticketing at venues of every size. ²³ Competitive Impact Statement §§ II.A, II.C (Defendants “tied artists’ access to Defendants’ amphitheaters to the use of Defendants’ promotion services”). ²⁴ Amended Complaint ¶¶ 28, 116, 119–137 (alleging ticketing and related conduct spanning venue sizes and festivals). The complaint’s primary ticketing monopolization claim contains no venue-capacity limitation. ²⁵ Opinion and Order on summary judgment, ECF No. 1037 (S.D.N.Y.); see Competitive Impact Statement § VI (acknowledging that ruling). The ruling did not narrow the primary ticketing claims by venue capacity. ²⁶ Jury verdict, United States, et al. v. Live Nation Entertainment, Inc., No. 1:24-cv-3973-AS (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2026). The counts tried were the primary ticketing monopolization claims, which carried no venue-capacity boundary, and the amphitheater monopolization and tying claims. The verdict therefore establishes monopolization of ticketing at venues of every size. ²⁷ Proposed Final Judgment § II.N. The 8,000-seat threshold and ten-event floor appear in no charging document in this case. ²⁸ Competitive Impact Statement n.2 (“‘Major Concert Venues’ generally refers to arenas and amphitheaters with a seating capacity of 8,000 or more. See Proposed Final Judgment, ECF No. 1523-2, Paragraph II(N).”). ²⁹ Competitive Impact Statement § II.A (describing the adjudicated conduct as entering “exclusive primary ticketing contracts with Major Concert Venues”). ³⁰ Jury verdict, United States, et al. v. Live Nation Entertainment, Inc., No. 1:24-cv-3973-AS (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2026). The counts tried were the primary ticketing monopolization claims, which carried no venue-capacity boundary, and the amphitheater monopolization and tying claims. The verdict therefore establishes monopolization of ticketing at venues of every size. ³¹ Live Nation venue development announcements (Venue Nation), 2024–2026, including new clubs and theaters announced for Milwaukee, Pittsburgh, Nashville, Tampa, San Diego, and Salt Lake City. [Live Nation Investing $1 Billion in U.S. Music Venues] ³² Proposed Final Judgment § IV.K (future contracting rules for Major Concert Venues only). ³³ Proposed Final Judgment § XVIII.E. ³⁴ Proposed Final Judgment § II.M. ³⁵ Proposed Final Judgment § II.Z. ³⁶ Proposed Final Judgment § II.N. The 8,000-seat threshold and ten-event floor do not appear in the complaint of this case. ³⁷ Proposed Final Judgment §§ II.X, II.M (a producer of only festivals bears risk for no “Live Entertainment Events” and is therefore not a “Promoter”). ³⁸ Proposed Final Judgment § XIV.A. ³⁹ Amended Complaint ¶¶ 119–137 (radius-clause allegations). The proposed Final Judgment contains no provision addressing radius clauses. ⁴⁰ Proposed Final Judgment §§ IV.A–IV.B (system requirements and the 275-day deadline at § IV.B.2; back-end cost-recovery fees at § IV.B.1, IV.J).⁴¹ Proposed Final Judgment §§ IV.A–IV.B (system requirements and the 275-day deadline at § IV.B.2; back-end cost-recovery fees at § IV.B.1, IV.J).⁴² Proposed Final Judgment §§ IV.A–IV.B (system requirements and the 275-day deadline at § IV.B.2; back-end cost-recovery fees at § IV.B.1, IV.J).⁴³ Proposed Final Judgment § V.A.⁴⁴ Proposed Final Judgment § XV.⁴⁵ Annie Rupertus, Live Nation antitrust settlement won't impact Bangor amphitheater, owner says, Bangor Daily News (Mar. 11, 2026), bangordailynews.com/2026/03/11/bangor/bangor-business/live-nation-antitrust-settlement-wont-impact-bangor-amphitheater ("There is zero change," according to Waterfront Concerts owner Alex Gray; the venue is operated and owned by Waterfront Concerts under a lease from the City). ⁴⁶ Proposed Final Judgment §§ II.P, V.F, XV (calendar procedures drafted and updated by Live Nation, which may continue booking and administering the calendars; no provision caps Live Nation’s share of a venue’s dates). ⁴⁷ Proposed Final Judgment § IV.J. ⁴⁸ Proposed Final Judgment § V.C. ⁴⁹ Amended Complaint (Live Nation’s ownership and control of artist management companies); see also Live Nation management holdings from SEC Exhibit 21 subsidiary filings, FY2005–FY2025. ⁵⁰ Proposed Final Judgment § XVIII.E. ⁵¹ Proposed Final Judgment § XIX.A (aggregating $18,563,016.81 in payments to the six Settling States). ⁵² Live Nation Entertainment, Inc., Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2025 Results (reporting $25.3 billion in 2025 revenue). At that rate, $5 million is approximately 1.7 hours of global revenue. ⁵³ Proposed Final Judgment § XVIII.E. ⁵⁴ Proposed Final Judgment § XIV.A. ⁵⁵ Amended Complaint (venue and promoter acquisitions; loss-taking on concerts subsidized by ticketing and sponsorship revenue); Competitive Impact Statement § II.B (Live Nation acquired and leased amphitheaters even where it projected financial losses). ⁵⁶ Proposed Final Judgment § XIV.A. ⁵⁷ Proposed Final Judgment §§ II.X, II.M (a producer of only festivals bears risk for no “Live Entertainment Events” and is therefore not a “Promoter”). ⁵⁸ Proposed Final Judgment § II.S(2) (excluding operating leases from “Preferred Booking Agreement”); § XIV.A(2) (exempting real estate and leases for new venue development from acquisition notice). ⁵⁹ Proposed Final Judgment § II.S(2) (excluding operating leases from “Preferred Booking Agreement”); § XIV.A(2) (exempting real estate and leases for new venue development from acquisition notice). ⁶⁰ Proposed Final Judgment § II.S(3) (excluding from “Preferred Booking Agreement” arrangements under which Live Nation promotes less than 50% of a venue’s events in a calendar year). ⁶¹ Proposed Final Judgment § XX (eight-year term). ⁶² Proposed Final Judgment § IX. ⁶³ Proposed Final Judgment § IX. ⁶⁴ Proposed Final Judgment § IX. ⁶⁵ Proposed Final Judgment § IX. ⁶⁶ Proposed Final Judgment § IX. ⁶⁷ Amended Complaint (Live Nation’s ownership and control of artist management companies); see also Live Nation management holdings from SEC Exhibit 21 subsidiary filings, FY2005–FY2025. ABOUT NIVA
The National Independent Venue Association (NIVA) is the nation’s live entertainment association, representing independent venues, festivals, promoters, and presenters across the United States. NIVA works to preserve and nurture the ecosystem of independent stages. NIVA empowers members and their teams with member benefits, advocacy on the state, local, and federal levels, an annual industry-leading conference, and more.
NIVA led the Save Our Stages campaign, culminating in landmark legislation in 2020 that established the $16.25 billion Shuttered Venue Operators Grant program, the largest arts investment in U.S. history.
NIVA is committed to equity in its support of independent stages. It seeks to create and encourage opportunities for venues, promoters, and festivals owned, operated, and staffed by people of color, women, non-binary, LGBTQ+, veterans, and people with disabilities.
CONTACT
Lucky Break PR
Kris Ferraro, Kris@luckybreakpr.com
Mike Stommel, Mike@luckybreakpr.com
